Ok FBI, let me know which ones to use
1/20/25: FBI Orders Americans to Use Unencrypted Messaging Apps
Why not Matrix ? Its E2E nit just TLS and also it prevents vendor lock in. This way chosing a providor is really about trust and not also about having to chose the same thing what your friends use
Someone didn’t see police got into it according to another article I just saw in another post.
Different matrix
Interesting. 2 spa with similar intents with the same name? Seems odd.
I mean this comment was the first time I’ve heard of either one, but based on the original comment and that article I’m surprised to hear this.
silly question maybe but after researching China a bit for a few days, I’m genuinely curious: I like supporting the LGBTQ cause, which I could see making me want to avoid Trump probing, but from what I researched, China gov is not against LGBTQ. So is there any specific reason I should fear China looking at my stuff?
Is it basically if I have account info in messages they would hack my accounts?https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/how-crackdown-transformed-lgbtq-activism-china
Looks like they’re cracking down on LGBT
interesting! thanks for sharing!
That’s great when my bank only uses sms for mfa though.
Seriously, bank and credit card companies need to get with the program more than me and my friends.
Steam. The store front I get my video games from. Has 2-factor authentication with a short time rotating code. To secure my Steam account.
My bank uses SMS and “security questions” aka personal trivia questions.
Easy to guess with some social engineering
While I agree with you, some people answer these questions with deliberately incorrect answers. If my closest friend tried to compromise my bank account with my security questions, he’d get them all wrong (and even he doesn’t know my wrong answers).
Still a bad design, though.
Or literally anyone who knows you. It’s based on the idea that strangers are the ones who will try to screw you over but everyone knows that it’s people who you know that end up screwing you over in most cases. So security questions are basically useless in all those cases.
That’s a huge part of why I use my brokerage, Fidelity, as my main bank, they support Symantec VIP TOTP. I prefer my regular TOTP solution, but this us miles ahead of literally every other bank I’ve used.
The only bank that allowed me to use totp was a credit union. You’d think the rich ass banks could afford to hire a developer to set up good MFA.
Yeah, and just for a few months. TOTP really isn’t that complicated…
Right? Had a bank account once, where the login password could only have up to 8 characters. And only digits.
Lucky, mine is 6 (yes, right now in 2024)
Swiss (Cheese) Bank?
I just checked my KeePass and turns out I still have the entry in the recycle bin.
It was 5 digits. Admittedly, that was “back in 2012,” but still. For shame, Bank Austria!
That’s wild
Are there still apps that arnt encrypted?
Telegram, for all their security claims, is basically not actually encrypted at all.
This is incorrect. Telegram is not end to end encrypted by default. But it is encrypted to and from their servers.
Luckily I misuse Telegram only as a system notification program.
TLS isn’t sufficient for messaging apps in 2024
Except Telegram doesn’t use TLS :) They use MTProto.
This is not me endorsing Telegram. I’m just pointing out your mistake. Telegram has other issues but it definitely does have transport encryption.
The above commenter said that their end-to-end MTProto protocol is not enabled by default.
Defaulting to just using transport encryption like TLS on a messaging app isn’t sufficient in 2024.
MTProto is not end-to-end. MTProto is their obfuscated client-server transport encryption.
What the commenter above is referring to is Telegram defaulting to saving your messages on the server in plaintext. You can use a “secret chat” which enables end-to-end encryption, but that is separate from MTProto.
Your sentiment is correct though. Messages should not be visible in plaintext to the server.
I dont know much about it, but Wikipedia says that MTProto is specifically for “secret chats”:
For encrypted chats (branded as Secret Chats), Telegram uses a custom-built symmetric encryption scheme called MTProto.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telegram_(software)#Architecture
Maybe Wikipedia is misleading here
yeah, that means not encrypted. When speaking to a web server, you are one end, and the server is the other. Tls ensures that there isn’t a man-in-the-middle.
In case of telegram, you are one end another user is the other end. Telegram themselves are, by design, a man-in-the-middle in this case. I’m not concerned about a different middleman intercepting communications between me and telegram. I’m concerned about any middleman (which includes telegram themselves) intercepting communications between me and my friend.
So no, telegram chats are not encrypted by default. Telegram can read them.
Thank you! It winds me up so much when people parrot that claim.
Telegram is encrypted in transit and encrypted at rest on their servers. At no point is any data stored or transmitted without encryption. Whether you believe their claims of never giving out encryption keys is another matter.
My view is that if the feds wanted my chat logs that badly they wouldn’t go after Telegram, they’d go after me and my device directly, and at that point all bets are off.
never giving out encryption keys is another matter.
but that part isn’t even relevant really… transport encryption isn’t per-user - nobody (meta, google, apple, banks) gives out transport encryption keys… and their “secret” chat bullshit is completely irrelevant because nobody actually uses it
I’m not sure what point you’re trying to make? The people that claim “Telegram is unencrypted” seem to be of the belief that literal plaintext is flying over the air for anyone with a mediocum of knowledge to easily intercept, and that’s just not true.
Lacking end-to-end encryption does not mean it lacks any encryption at all, and that point seems to escape most people.
To take it to its logical conclusion you can argue that Signal is also “unencrypted” because it needs to be eventually in order for you to read a message. Ridiculous? Absolutely, but so is the oft-made opine that Telegram is unencrypted.
The difference is that Telegram stores a copy of your chats that they themselves can decrypt for operational reasons. It’s up to the user to decide whether the additional functionality that comes with this is worth the risk of a hostile agent successfully requisitioning those chats directly from Telegram themselves, rather than just busting through your door and threatening to break your legs if you don’t unlock your phone.
On the other hand, if you fill your Telegram hosted chats with a whole load of benign crap that nobody could possibly care about and actually use the “secret chat bullshit” for your spicier chats then you have plausible deniability baked right in.
Lacking end-to-end encryption does not mean it lacks any encryption at all, and that point seems to escape most people.
Not using end-to-end encryption is the equivalent of using best practice developed nearly 30 years ago [1] and saying “this is good enough”. E2EE as a default has been taking off for about 10 years now [2], that Telegram is going into 2025 and still doesn’t have this basic feature tells me they’re not serious about security.
To take it to its logical conclusion you can argue that Signal is also “unencrypted” because it needs to be eventually in order for you to read a message. Ridiculous? Absolutely, but so is the oft-made opine that Telegram is unencrypted.
Ridiculous? Yes, you’re missing the entire point of end-to-end encryption, which you immediately discredit any security Telegram wants to claim:
The difference is that Telegram stores a copy of your chats that they themselves can decrypt for operational reasons.
Telegram (and anyone who may have access to their infrastructure, via hack or purchase) has complete access to view your messages. This is what E2EE prevents. With Telegram, someone could have access to all your private messages and you would never know. With E2EE someone would need to compromise your personal device(s). One gives you zero options to protect yourself against the invasion of your privacy, the other lets you take steps to protect yourself.
the other hand, if you fill your Telegram hosted chats with a whole load of benign crap that nobody could possibly care about and actually use the “secret chat bullshit” for your spicier chats then you have plausible deniability baked right in.
The problem here is that you should not be mixing secure contexts with insecure ones, basic OPSEC. Signal completely mitigates this by making everything private by default. The end user does not need to “switch context” to be secure.
[1] Developed by Netscape, SSL was released in 1995 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#SSL_1.0,_2.0,_and_3.0
[2] Whatsapp gets E2EE in 2014, Signal (then known as TextSecure, was already using E2EE) - https://www.wired.com/2014/11/whatsapp-encrypted-messaging/
Yeah that’s cool and all but you’re strawmanning. Your original comment, that I hear parroted a lot, is that Telegram is (basically) unencrypted, and regardless of your feelings about the suitability of MTProto (not SSL) that’s patently untrue.
There’s no evidence that MTProto has ever been cracked, nor any evidence of them selling or allowing anyone access to their servers and recent headline news backs this up. Whether you choose to trust them with your data is up to the individual to decide. I’m just tired of seeing the “Telegram is unencrypted” claim in every instant messaging thread, made by people who don’t know or care to know the difference between encryption and E2E encryption.
Google, on the other hand, routinely allow “agencies” access to their servers, often without a warrant, and WhatsApp - who you cite as a good example of E2E encryption - stores chat backups on GDrive unencrypted by default. They added the option to encrypt last year but nobody was forced (or possibly even asked?) to turn it on, and to this day no encryption of backups is still the default. And while you might encrypt your backups, can you be sure the same is true for the people on the other end of your chats?
also they removed it
it’s still there, but hidden. You need to tap the username in the chat window, and then it’ll be in that screen’s triple-dot button menu.
There are many where the server owners can see the messages, just not anyone else between the sender and receiver.
Threema and Signal are good options that don’t do this.
Signal being an American company is also problematic.
These two are the best balance of security/convenience, however.
server location and legal jurisdiction shouldn’t matter for any truly secure messenger
What do you mean?
if a messenger is truly 0 trust end to end encryption, it doesn’t matter who owns the servers or the legal protections of data because they won’t have any data anyway. that’s why signal is so good, when they get subpoenaed the only information that they actually have is the last connection and message sent unix times or something. still secure regardless of being in the US and being run on centralized Amazon, google, and cloudflare servers.
Then the jurisdiction of software development matters. Don’t want a back door being forced into an update by the FBI.
You can create and run your own Signal server if you don’t trust Signal.
Interesting. Are the server and client open source? Is a self-hosted server interoperable with the main ones?
Signal is completely open source and auditable by anyone: https://github.com/signalapp
if you were to create your own clone, it would not interoperate with the real one.
