Any war against Iran risks repeating the classic mistake of Gallipoli: a superpower’s underestimation of a determined defense strongly favored by geography.

In 1915, the British Empire believed its superior fleet would be enough to force the Dardanelles and bring down the Ottoman Empire with relative ease.

Generals and politicians, including Winston Churchill, Ian Hamilton, and Lord Kitchener, viewed the Turks as a backward army of “doubtful value” that would flee at the first salvo from British battleships. Reality proved very different.

The geography of Gallipoli turned the attack into a nightmare. The Ottomans controlled the steep heights above the beaches. Once the Allies landed, they became trapped on narrow strips of sand, fully exposed to machine-gun and artillery fire from above.

Advancing or retreating safely was nearly impossible. This is exactly the same natural wall that Iran possesses today in the mountains that surround nearly its entire coast.

Any force attempting a landing in the Persian Gulf would immediately face steep elevations right behind the beaches, giving the defender total visibility and fire superiority. Beyond geography, Iran possesses something the British also underestimated in the Turks: the ability to conduct a saturation defense.

While offensive and defensive munitions stocks are running low for the attackers, Iran is preparing a war of saturation. Thousands of drones of various types, missiles, and fast attack boats launched in swarms could quickly overwhelm and exhaust the coalition’s ability to provide cover for a landing in Iran.

Logistics represent another fatal bottleneck. In Gallipoli, the Allies could not sustain the flow of supplies under constant fire. In Iran, the challenge would be even greater: supply lines could not rely on American bases in the region, which have already been heavily damaged and under fire for 26 days.

They would instead depend on much more distant logistics, supported by an already weakened American industrial base. Meanwhile, Iran would be fighting at home, with underground factories, short supply lines, and the ability to open multiple fronts through Iraqi militias and the Houthis.

In parallel, the Strait of Hormuz functions as the modern equivalent of the Dardanelles. Iran dominates the area with sophisticated yet relatively cheap naval mines, anti-ship missiles, drones, and its own navy.

The loss of just one or two major ships, or landing vessels, would be enough for the entire operation to collapse, just as happened in 1915 when simple mines sank three British battleships in a single day.

The error of assessment is the same as it was a century ago. Just as the British believed the Turks “had no stomach for modern warfare,” today some assume that an intense technological bombardment would quickly cause the Iranian regime to collapse.

Statements like Netanyahu’s, “Iran is a paper tiger… A strong blow and the regime will fall”, dangerously echo the declarations of Churchill and Hamilton [and Hitler].

Both ignored the fact that a nation of tens of millions of people, fighting on its own territory with strong ideological motivation, does not easily surrender to technological superiority.

Gallipoli cost the Allies around 250,000 casualties, including tens of thousands killed, and ended in a humiliating withdrawal. It was a meat grinder that exposed the arrogance of a superpower when it collided with the reality of the terrain and the defender’s determination.

Any potential amphibious landing in Iran today carries the same risk of becoming a Persian Gallipoli: where excessive faith in technology runs into an insurmountable geography, a mass of missiles and drones, and the overwhelming advantage of those fighting on home soil.

Iran is the opening conflict of a multipolar world, a reality that America, Israel and probably the entire west still fail to recognize.