MarmiteLover123 [comrade/them, any]

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Cake day: 2022年9月19日

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  • Egypt also has the export variant of the S-300V4 though, an advanced mobile anti ballistic missile defence system from Russia, they obtained a few years ago. (The S-300V and S-300P systems are actually completely different systems, that share a similar name). The S-300Vs will almost certainly be providing cover from ballistic threats for the HQ-9Bs in an integrated air defence network (at least I hope they will). The combination of the two systems makes sense. Iran’s S-300PMU-2 fire control radars, a similar system to the HQ-9 (the HQ-9 is a direct descendant of the S-300PMU-2/SA-20, but with western radars and command and control technology/philosophy, including track via missile guidance similar to the Patriot system), were likely taken out by Israel’s air launched ballistic missiles in attacks in April and October last year. So having a system to cover against ballistic threats is very important if the adversary is Israel. Israel are likely the world leader in air launched ballistic missiles with a vast arsenal only rivaled by China.

    For those wondering, Iran did try to get S-300V systems in 2013, but Russia said no. They got upgraded to S-300PMU-2 in the end, but not S-300V. The clown Dmitry Medvedev was responsible for this shambles.

    But your overall point is definitely correct, China can provide military hardware just as good (or better) than Europe or Russia, for considerably cheaper. And unlike Russia who are currently at war with Ukraine, there’s no need to overpay, pay upfront, or wait for deliveries. Russia is falling behind in the advanced military technology department vs China and the USA.





  • Over three years into the Ukraine war, Russia has finally stopped using lower frequency long wavelength radio for communications between strategic bombers . They are now using higher frequency shorter wavelength radio, suggested to be UHF, for communications. UHF radio is propagated by line of sight and has a much shorter range. This means Ukrainian hobbyist radio operators can no longer listen in on the communications of the bombers (for example, the bombers announcing the launch of cruise missiles and launch location on radio), and can no longer announce the launch of missiles on their telegram channels. These telegram channels only know that the missiles are on their way when they get detected and enter Ukrainian airspace. This change has affected all monitoring channels.

    How long before Russia uses SATCOM radio for long range secure communications on strategic bomber and refueling aircraft, so they can’t be tracked at takeoff and can operate “radio silent”. Do we have to wait another three years?







  • European defence strategy has very much been doing the minimum to deter Russia (while needlessly poking the bear) and relying on the US for everything else. This is how Europe was able to keep their welfare state functional under the capitalistic model, they were not responsible for their own security for the most part and Russia provided cheap natural resources for say Germany, and France had the neo colonies in Africa. For example, the entirety of Europe’s 5th generation stealth fighter fleet is F-35s. Not a single domestically produced European 5th generation stealth aircraft is flying, and won’t be for at least a decade. Even aviation powerhouses like France don’t have anything more than CGI renders at this point.

    Wouldn’t you want to keep building them, even at a reduced rate of production, just to keep that tooling/skilled workforce/institutional knowledge around?

    France did that, making missiles for export orders, and all the tooling is still around. The UK was doing updates and maintenance on already built missiles, the factories weren’t shut down. There were no orders from the French or UK militaries, so no need to make missiles no one is buying from the perspective of MDBA. That has changed.





  • The US Navy usually doesn’t get close enough for these weapons to be used against them, they usually have to be engaged with longer range weapons. So they are very effective in area denial. The last time a US Navy warship, an Arleigh Burke class AEGIS equipped missile destroyer, transited the Bab al-Mandab Strait, it had to be escorted by F-35C fighter aircraft, which helped with destroying the missiles on the ground before firing, and using it’s advanced radar and DAS/EOTS systems to track the ballistic and cruise missile launches and pass on this information to the AEGIS system so it could intercept. This was actually the combat debut of the F-35C.

    As for the numbers of missiles, the Fateh 110 has been produced for over 20 years by Iran, and the Fateh Mobin guidance kit was revealed in 2018 and can be equipped on any Fateh 110 variant. There are potentially many of these missiles that can easily be converted to Fateh Mobin.

    The Fajr-4CL is a newer weapon, first unveiled in 2020 by the IRGC. But it shouldn’t be too difficult to produce, given it’s an extended range 333 mm guided artillery rocket. Iran has been producing 333mm artillery rockets since the 1990s, the electro optical terminal guidance and extended range is the new part.

    Iran has been operating Noor/C-802 missiles since the early 2000s, Hezbollah struck two ships, including one Israeli Navy warship, during the 2006 war with this missile. There should be plenty in the stockpiles.


  • HQ-9B survivability is also an issue, Iran had very similar systems in the S-300PMU2 batteries (the HQ-9 is a direct descendant of this system), and the fire control radars were likely taken out in Israel’s April and October 2024 attacks by air launched ballistic missiles. To defend against these threats, you need interceptor missiles specifically designed to intercept ballistic missiles, the HQ-9Bs will need to be protected by systems that offer that, or have that capability themselves. I haven’t seen a single image online of the HQ-9 systems with the kind of interceptors you’d ideally need for that threat. What Iran would need from China is a Patriot PAC 3 MSE (used in Patriot and MEADS) or 9M96E2 (used in the S-400 and S-350) class kinetic interceptor, which China has in an unmanned HQ system, for now called the land based HQ-26 (different from the naval HQ-26). It looks like this, basically the Chinese equivalent to MEADS and the S-350.

    Alternatively, a S-300V series, or HQ-18/HQ-29 for the suspected Chinese version, anti ballistic missile system is needed. These don’t use kinetic interceptors, but large area effect warheads and are designed with a specific focus on intercepting ballistic missiles. Israel has a similar system in this philosophy called Arrow 2.

    If the HQ-9s aren’t protected by such a system or have the capability themselves, they might end up facing the same fate as the Iranian S-300PMU2s.