While I am technically on vacation I did want to send a brief update on the ceasefire that Joe Biden announced earlier today between Israel and Hezbollah. Momentum had been building toward this for several days now, despite outward appearances as the Israelis maintained and arguably intensified their bombing campaign. Indeed, they continued bombarding Lebanon throughout the day on Tuesday, while Hezbollah kept up its rocket attacks on Israel, everybody getting in a few last licks before the ceasefire goes into effect at 4 AM Wednesday local time. If all goes well this will mark the end of a conflict that started shortly after Hamas’s October 7 2023 attack in southern Israel, when Hezbollah began firing rockets into northern Israel. That conflict has killed nearly 3800 people in Lebanon and nearly 130 in Israel, while displacing upwards of 1.2 million in Lebanon and some 46,000 in Israel.

The deal in its most basic form opens a 60 day window, during which Hezbollah and Israel will attempt to implement the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Lebanon War. That means Hezbollah will withdraw its military forces, or at least its large weapons that are capable of striking Israel, north of the Litani River or about 30-ish (give or take) kilometers from the Israeli border. The Israelis in turn will withdraw from southern Lebanon. If those two conditions are met then the 60 day window will turn into a full-fledged ceasefire—at least until the next time Israel and Hezbollah go to war. Israel’s security cabinet approved the deal on Tuesday prior to Biden’s announcement. The Lebanese government had already signaled its approval, which came along with Hezbollah’s indirect approval.

There are mechanisms in the deal that aim to ensure Hezbollah’s compliance. The most immediate of those involves the Lebanese military, such as it is. As the Israeli military (IDF) and Hezbollah withdraw, Lebanese forces will deploy to the area between the Litani and the Israeli border where they will function in concert with the United Nations peacekeeping force (UNIFIL) to police the ceasefire. This is where the United States and France enter the picture. They’re apparently committed to supporting the Lebanese military and improving its capabilities so that it’s able to fulfill this mission, as well as to unspecified measures to improve the wrecked Lebanese economy.

The US and French governments will also join the Israeli and Lebanese governments, and UNIFIL, in overseeing the deal. This is a significant development considering that as recently as Sunday the Israeli government was refusing to have anything to do with Paris because Emmanuel Macron had recognized the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Lebanese government had conversely insisted on French participation, presumably reasoning that the French government might actually try to constrain future Israeli military action where the United States is barely even a rubber stamp anymore on that front. That’s important because the main thing the overseers will be doing is determining whether/when the Israelis are entitled to resume their military campaign in Lebanon.

By all accounts, Israeli officials wanted it written into the deal that they retain the right to use Lebanon as a free-fire zone if they decide that Hezbollah isn’t meeting its obligations. That is not, as far as I know, explicitly written into the agreement Biden announced on Tuesday, surely because it was unacceptable to Hezbollah and the Lebanese government. But the Israelis reportedly have assurances from Washington that the US will support their reentry into Lebanon should it come to that.

Based on what’s been reported so far I think we have to conclude that the Israelis have gotten much of what they wanted out of this conflict. In the main they got Hezbollah to break its “Axis of Resistance” ties to Hamas and agree to a ceasefire that has nothing to do with Gaza. That’s meaningful both in the near term, as it means in theory that the Israeli government can begin moving displaced people back into northern Israel without having to interrupt its genocidal campaign, and in the long term, if it permanently fractures the relationship between those two groups. Then there’s the damage Hezbollah has taken. Over the course of the past 13 months the Israelis were able to exploit apparently gaping holes in the internal security of Hezbollah or one of its allies to kill several of its senior leaders, including former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, along with a larger number of mid-level officials. Those losses will take time to overcome.

That said, the Israelis haven’t gotten everything. For all the hits it’s taken Hezbollah is still standing and still seemed to be putting up a fairly robust resistance to IDF incursions in southern Lebanon—robust enough that it may have made Israeli leaders more amenable to a ceasefire. It’s also still a major force in Lebanese politics, and if we take its civilian elements into account the damage it’s suffered over the past 13 months is still significant but not debilitating. As I noted earlier the Israelis didn’t get the explicit permission they wanted to continue operating in Lebanon with impunity, though that’s more a technical setback than a real one.

This deal is hours old and as I write this it only came into effect about 30 minutes ago so I think to say much more would be to delve fully into speculation, and to be completely frank I think I’d rather go back to being on vacation. One bit of speculation that I will offer is the possibility that this deal isn’t so much going to end the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah as shift the locus of that fighting into Syria. The IDF has never been reluctant to attack Hezbollah targets in Syria but it’s ratcheted up the frequency and intensity of such attacks in recent weeks, and it may be worth noting that after Biden’s announcement it bombed three crossings along the Lebanese-Syrian border in northern Lebanon. We’ve also seen reports of late about IDF construction projects in the occupied Golan that may be encroaching deeper into Syrian territory.

Bashar al-Assad’s government has been scrupulous about staying out of this conflict and maybe he’s got some sort of private understanding with the Israelis, but I still think this is something to watch. I’m not saying that the Israelis will immediately shift their operations to Syria in anything like the intensity we’ve seen in Lebanon, but over time they may continue to ramp things up on that front.